Maj. Gen. (res.) Yoav Gallant - Israel Hayom
The state comptroller's
report on Operation Protective Edge is due out shortly, and the widely
held assessment is that it will determine that the events of the summer
of 2014 stemmed from underestimating the enemy, from the IDF's ongoing
lack of preparedness under then-Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, and
from oversight negligence on the part of then-Defense Minister Moshe
Ya'alon. The soldiers and the commanders on the battlefield operated
well, with courage and determination. The defense minister and the upper
echelons of the military failed.
In Operation Protective
Edge, which was later dubbed a "war" to justify its problematic
results, there were two sides with a force discrepancy of at least
1,000:1. The IDF, an experienced and equipped army, vs. the Hamas
militia, which had dug underground and was outfitted with mostly
primitive weaponry. The serious military failure and the
disproportionate ratio of forces that led to a partial achievement only
are helpful to those who wish to obscure it. We must learn the true
lessons of the operation to prepare for the challenges of the future
against enemies that are many times stronger and more steadfast.
The IDF is an army that
has simultaneously defeated multiple enemies in the wars that Israel
has fought. The army was surprised by the massive Egyptian enlistment in
the Yom Kippur War, but, in the space of three weeks, turned the tables
around, and the war ended, as we know, 101 kilometers (63 miles)
outside Cairo, not Tel Aviv.
The Gaza test was a
simple and relatively easy challenge compared to those that await us.
The bar for Protective Edge was low, and yet we barely cleared it. The
enemies around us are asking what will happen when the bar is raised to a
realistic height in a real war against stronger enemy forces. They
might calculate their steps based on their memory of this failed fight. A
limited battle like Protective Edge is supposed to be short and
effective, not costly in terms of wounded or resources. But it turned
out to be long, unsuccessful, and very costly by any standard.
The former defense
minister and chief of staff probably knew about the tunnels beforehand.
Every Israeli knows they knew. Photos from inside the tunnels covered
the news pages. Nothing was done to prepare for the threat. No equipment
was acquired, no battle tactics devised, no plans were drawn up, and no
forces were appropriately trained. The role of the army is to prepare
and equip itself, and the role of the defense minister is to oversee and
decide on priorities. They have an obligation to put together options
and present them to the cabinet ahead of time and when they are ordered
to. The prime minister and the cabinet start the battle from the point
at which chief of staff and the defense minister make it known to them
which plans need to be prepared, which forces should be trained, and
which weapons must be acquired.
As a result of the
faulty preparation process by Gantz and Ya'alon, the cabinet was
presented with only two options: one of "almost nothing" and the other
"almost everything." The first option entailed little accomplishment and
the second carried a high price. It's not hard to understand why the
cabinet went with the first option. The war against the tunnels was
improvised because of faulty preparation to confront a known threat.
Improvisation is costly.
Israel entrusts its
chief of staff and defense minister with what is most precious to it --
the tens of thousands of young men and women who enlist in the IDF each
year. It puts over 70 billion shekels ($20 billion) a year at their
disposal, as well as extensive authority over very important matters.
The vast resources are placed in their hands with a clear purpose in
mind: to secure the country, preserve its sovereignty, and protect its
residents.
Over the years,
hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers have worked to prepare
for much worse scenarios than the war of the summer of 2014.
Sophisticated aircraft, modern warships, and surface weaponry are
acquired first and foremost as a response to much weightier threats than
the one Hamas poses.
The period of wars in our region is not over, and the battle clock has not stopped.
It would be appropriate
for this war to serve as a warning light for the ones to come. If we
want to stay alive, we must learn some real lessons from it. We must not
see the results of the operation as an achievement, and woe betide us
if we instruct the generations of combat soldiers to come based on our
"success."
The soldiers'
courageous spirit is a vital, precious asset in any battle. This time,
too, they are worthy of praise. But even the best soldiers need
talented, brave, and deserving leadership, and this was not the case
during Protective Edge. Ya'alon and Gantz failed.
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